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LIST OF PARTIES 
The original parties to this action are West Valley 
City and Frank R. Borrego. This appeal arises out of a contempt 
citation by the Fifth Circuit Court. As a consequence, the 
actual parties to this appeal are the Fifth Circuit Court and 
Mr. Borrego. West Valley City does not participate in the ap-
peal . 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent does not contest t|he Statement of Jurisdic-
tion made by the appellant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Respondent does not contest the Statement of Issues 
made by the appellant and does not restate them here in accor-
dance with Rule 24(b), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The text of the relevant statutes is given in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CJ^ SE 
In accordance with Rule 24(b), Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, Respondent does not contest the statement of the 
case made by the appellant. However, the Court is reminded that 
the facts stated in the appellantfs Brief are not complete in 
describing the proceeding at issue. Additional facts, with 
appropriate citations to the record, are contained in this Brief 
in support of the action of the Fifth Circuit Court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Fifth Circuit Court, respondent, argues and shows 
herein that to prevail the appellant must show that the trial 
court abused its discretion. As the acts of the appellant which 
led to the contempt citation were within the statutory framework 
of contempt, no abuse of discretion can be shown and the con-
tempt conviction should stand. 
ARGUMENTS 
A- STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Code provides in §78-7-17 and §78-7-18 that 
judicial officers have the power to punish for contempt in ap-
propriate cases as provided by law. Those acts which may cons-
titute contempt are specifically defined in §78-32-1 of the Utah 
Code. Section 78-32-3 further refines this judicial power by 
allowing judges to punish contempt by summary action. See Ad-
dendum. 
Utah law is well-settled that the citation of contempt 
is a matter of discretion with the trial judge and that the 
contempt citation should be overturned on appeal only where the 
court has acted so unreasonably as to be classified as capri-
cious and arbitrary or a clear abuse of judicial discretion is 
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shown. Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah 1976); 
Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977). 
The legal analysis of this appeal is two-pronged. 
First, this Court should review the record to determine whether 
the contempt citation is consistent with the statutory framework 
for contempt. Then, the Court should Examine the action of the 
Fifth Circuit Court to determine whether its action was arbi-
trary, capricious, or a clear abuse of discretion. There is a 
presumption that the trial court acted properly and the burden 
of showing error is on Mr. Borrego. $tate v. Noren, 704 P.2d 
568 (Utah 1985). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S ACTION 
COMPLIED WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE UTAH CODE 
The transcript of proceedings], which is part of the 
record of this appeal, clearly describes the words and acts of 
Mr. Borrego which led to the contempt citation. No attempt will 
be made here to repeat all the details of the transcript, but 
certain events occurring therein should be highlighted for the 
Courtfs analysis. 
The transcript makes clear th&t the entire incident 
occurred in the presence of the trial court. The following 
offensive and disruptive acts occurred: 
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A. Mr. Borrego continually interrupted the court as 
it spoke. See Transcript, p. 6, 9, 11. 
B. Mr. Borrego engaged in profanity directed at the 
court. Transcript, p. 7. 
C. Mr. Borrego called the court a liar. Transcript, 
p. 9 and 11. 
D. Mr. Borrego was told at least twice by his own 
counsel to be quiet. Transcript, p. 7. 
E. The court indicated that the manner in which Mr. 
Borrego was acting was disrupting the court. Transcript, p. 9, 
lines 4-18. 
The facts recited above clearly fall within the con-
tempt statute found at §78-32-1 of the Utah Code. See Addendum. 
That is, the profanity, interruption of speaking, and general 
insolent behavior was directed toward the judge and tended to 
interrupt the due course of the sentencing of Mr. Borrego by the 
trial court. 
The trial court entered specific findings that the 
proceeding was disrupted as required by §78-32-3. Record, pp. 
14-15. 
In summary, all of the statutory requirements have 
been met by the court for imposing a sentence for contempt in 
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that disorderly, contemptuous, and insolent behavior toward the 
court occurred in the presence of the court which tended to 
disrupt the proceeding and appropriate findings were entered. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID MOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
An admittedly difficult analytical issue is presented 
by the nature of a contempt citation. The determination of what 
constitutes insolent behavior or the use of profane language 
sufficient to merit a contempt citation is a judgment call not 
easily submitted to objective analysis. That analysis is quali-
tative in nature and requires an appellate court to some extent 
second-guess the trial court to find an abuse of discretion 
sufficient to merit reversal on appeal. An examination of the 
total circumstances shows that the Fifth Circuit Court acted in 
accordance with law. 
Appellant cannot and does not deny that the acts for 
which punishment was imposed actually occurred. Significantly, 
appellant does not claim that the words spoken were not con-
temptuous. Rather, the thrust of the appellant's brief is to 
argue that the words spoken were somehow protected or that the 
judge abused his discretion by not issuing a warning prior to 
citation. Each of those contentions do not survive examination. 
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1. Free Speech. Appellantfs argument that the offen-
sive and disruptive comments to the court were protected by the 
First Amendment is without merit and fails for two reasons. 
The first reason the claimed free speech interest 
fails is that it was not raised in the trial court. There is no 
assertion reflected in the record to the effect that Mr. Borrego 
had a right to speak as he did to the court. New issues cannot 
be raised for the first time on appeal. Lopez v. Schulsen, 716 
P.2d 787 (Utah 1986). 
The second reason the free speech argument fails is 
that the right to free speech has never been considered to be 
unfettered. That is, onefs First Amendment rights exist only in 
the context of an acceptable time, place, and manner of expres-
sion. See, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 82 L.Ed.2d 221, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). The purpose 
of the contempt statute is to preserve the due course of judi-
cial proceedings without unlawful interference to protect Mr. 
Borrego and the public from the evils which arise out of anarchy 
in a courtroom. Robinson v. City Corp. for City of Ogden, 112 
Utah 36, (1947). To allow the plaintiff to invoke the First 
Amendment in defense of disrupting a judicial proceeding is to 
launch an attack on the very forum which protects the constit-
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utional rights of Mr. Borrego. The irony of his position is 
that the more disruption allowed in a court, the less protection 
will be able to be given to the constitutional rights he seeks 
to assert. Anarchy is the antithesis of an ordered constitu-
tional system. Appellant fails to show any authority that 
shields under the First Amendment disruptive courtroom behavior. 
He has not shown that the speech uttered was appropriate at the 
time and place at issue. 
Finally, there is no authority cited to claim that the 
Utah Constitution protects speech which is disruptive of orderly 
judicial procedure. Absent some legal authority, the presump-
tion that the trial court acted correctly is not overcome. 
2. Duty to Warn. A second argument advanced by Mr. 
Borrego is that the judge was required to forewarn him that his 
conduct was contumacious before a finding of contempt was made. 
This argument also fails. 
No statutory requirement exists for a warning. As a 
result, it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion 
in the context of the statute. Rather, one must look to that 
qualitative analysis mentioned above to determine if an abuse of 
discretion has occurred when measured against reasonableness. 
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An excellent discussion of the policies behind the 
contempt statute for the federal courts is given in United 
States v, Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972). A reading of 
that case will show that those policies apply to the judiciary 
generally and the protection of judicial proceedings and have 
value in analyzing this case. Seale arose out of the prosecu-
tion in Chicago of seven Black Panthers who engaged in conduct 
which continuously disrupted their criminal trial. When Seale 
was cited for contempt, he appealed and raised the warning is-
sue. The Seale court explained that, as a general proposition, 
specific intent is required for a contempt conviction. The role 
of a warning is to meet a due process requirement of a finding 
of intent. That is, one may show that a person intended to 
disrupt judicial proceedings by showing the person was warned 
that the conduct was disruptive. 
The Seale court explained that there is no specific 
requirement for a warning. At 366. Instead, the evidence of 
intent may be derived by the very nature of the conduct under 
the circumstances. Intent can be found by conduct which one 
should or reasonably should have been aware was wrongful. This 
analysis is one of looking for an obstruction of the proceeding 
due to an activity which goes beyond mere insult to the court. 
-8-
Because characterization of the act is qualitative, it is sub-
ject to the discretion of the judge. See also, Gordon v. U.S., 
592 F.2d 1215 (1st Cir. 1979). 
The intent of Mr. Borrego to improperly disrupt the 
proceedings is easily determined by reviewing the record. 
First, the court indicated at p. 9 of the transcript that it 
found the profanity offensive. Rather than responding with an 
apology, Mr. Borrego proceeded to further denigrate the court. 
Page 9 of the transcript also indicates that Mr. Borrego was 
acting in a same manner as on a prior day when he was physically 
removed from the courtroom. Further, he was told a couple of 
times by his own counsel to be quiet. 
In summary, there is sufficient information in the 
transcript to show that Mr. Borrego was warned in a variety of 
ways that his conduct was unacceptable. Additionally, he en-
gaged in conduct which a reasonable person would realize would 
be disruptive of the judicial proceeding, so no actual warning 
was required. As a result, the issue of intent is clearly re-
solved against Mr. Borrego by the warnings given and by the 
nature of his acts. It cannot reasonably be said that the trial 
court acted arbitrarily or abused its discretion under the actu-
al circumstances of the proceedings. 
-9-
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed acts of Mr. Borrego were disruptive of 
the judicial proceeding in which they occurred. The court prop-
erly exercised its discretion to summarily punish the contempt 
which occurred in its presence. The conviction should be af-
firmed. 
DATED this 30^ day of December, 1987. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGOR^J^/ SANDERS 
Attorney for Respondent 
Fifth Circuit Court 
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ADDENDUM 
- 1 1 -
78-7-17. Powers of every judicial officer. 
Every judicial officer has power: 
(1) to preserve and enforce order in his immediate presence, and in 
proceedings before him, when he is engaged in the performance of official 
duty. 
(2) to compel obedience to his lawful orders as provided by law. 
(3) to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a proceeding before 
him in the cases and manner provided by law. 
(4) to administer oaths to persons in a proceeding pending before him, 
and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of his 
powers and duties. 
78-7-18. Power to punish for contempt. 
For the effectual exercise of the powers conferred by the next preceding 
section [§ 78-7-17] a judicial officer may punish for contempt in the cases 
provided by law. 
78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein 
are contempts of the authority of the court: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge 
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or 
other judicial proceeding. 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tend-
ing to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by 
an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to 
perform a judicial or ministerial service. 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a 
party to an action or special proceeding. 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court. 
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and 
acting as such without authority. 
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer b\ 
virtue of an order or process of such court. 
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, 
remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on the 
calendar for trial. 
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process oi proceedings of 
a court. 
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or 
to answer as a witness. 
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or 
serve as such, or improperly conversing with a party to an action to be 
tried at such court, or with any other person, concerning the merits of 
such action, or receiving a communication from a party or other person in 
respect to it, without immediately disclosing the same to the court. 
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the 
lawful judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding in an 
action or special proceeding contrary to law, after such action or special 
proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior tribunal, 
magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or process of a 
judicial officer is also a contempt of the authority of such officer. 
78-32-3. In immediate presence of court; summary action 
— Without immediate presence; procedure. 
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the 
court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which an 
order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate view 
and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby guilty of 
a contempt, and that he be punished as prescribed in § 78-32-10 hereof. When 
the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the 
court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the court or 
judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the 
referees or arbitrators or other judicial officers. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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